Sentiment is shown to inuence both West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent futures prices during the period 2002 -2013. This is demonstrated while controlling for stock indices, exchange rates, nancial costs, inventory and supply levels as well as OPEC activity. Sentiment indices are developed for WTI and Brent crude oils using a suite of nancial proxies similar to those used in equity research where the inuence of sentiment has already been established. Given the novel nature of this study, multiple hypothesis testing techniques are used to ensure that these conclusions are statistically robust.
Introduction
This research is motivated by evidence that sentiment inuences the behaviour of the stock markets. We show that sentiment inuences prices in the professionallytraded oil markets by measuring sentiment using indices constructed from a suite of appropriate nancial oil market proxies. These indices for West Texas Intermediate Coates and Herbert (2008) show a link between testosterone levels and trading outcomes; Froot et al. (2011) show that current trading decisions are subject to sensitivity to past portfolio losses, while a recent qualitative study by Fenton-O'Creevy et al.
(2011) of 118 UK-based professional traders in equity, bond, and derivatives markets nds that traders allow emotions to inuence their trading decision-making in a manner that deviates from purely rational decision-making.
Sentiment is known to exist in the equity markets. Schmeling (2009) reports that sentiment has a signicant inuence on stock market returns across many industrialised countries and has a greater eect on countries which have less market integrity and more herd-like behaviour from investors. The work of Baker and Wurgler (2006) shows that sentiment is most inuential on rms which are dicult to value. This conrmed the work of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) which shows that decisions made regarding investment are at times biased and subject to systematic errors. These eects are not removed by arbitrage due to the limits to arbitrage encountered in the equity markets as described by Barberis and Thaler (2003) . Wang (2001) shows that sentiment is active in the agricultural commodity markets. Borovkova (2011) demonstrates the inuence of sentiment in the oil markets by showing that the shape of the forward curve is inuenced by very strong or very weak sentiment as measured by the Thomson Reuters NewsScope product.
1 Dowling, Cummins and Lucey (2014) show evidence for the existence of psychological price barriers in the crude oil markets. Borovkova (2011) and Dowling, Cummins and Lucey (2014) show that sentiment is inuential in the oil market. However, these papers do not consider the whole range of sentiment. We show that sentiment can be quantied and used to explain price movements. In this investigation we use sentiment in oil price models for WTI and Brent and treat it as an additional variable to the chosen fundamental variables. In doing so we add to the literature showing that sentiment does not just have an inuence in extreme or in specic circumstances but has a widespread measurable eect.
We propose that there is sentiment in the oil markets because of the need for spec-1 Thomson Reuters Newscope measures the sentiment of the text in news reports using a proprietary sentiment engine, the details of which are not publicly available.
ulation and because of information asymmetry between oil producers and the other market participants. Long and short hedging activity in the oil markets is not balanced (Hirshleifer, 1990) . Oil producers are vulnerable to unexpected changes in the price of oil and need short hedging positions. However, oil consumers are less vulnerable as they have many other cost pools in addition to oil prices and so have a lesser need for long hedging positions. This is in keeping with hedging pressure theory from Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) . Thus we have a situation where speculators provide insurance to producers by taking the excess long positions not taken by consumers, but only producers have access to all the information regarding oil reserves and supply issues. Kaufmann (2011 ), Coleman (2012 , Fan and Xu (2011) and Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) all show that speculation is an important driver of oil prices. As with the equity markets there are limits to arbitrage, namely the size of the positions traders are permitted to take and the size of the margin calls which traders will incur while they wait for their prots to materialize. Acharya, Lochstoer and Ramadorai (2013) make it clear that the limits imposed by margin calls make arbitrage partially ineective in the oil markets. Therefore arbitrage is limited in its ability to remove the eect of sentiment.
Following the methods applied by Baker and Wurgler (2006) , Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Baker, Wurgler and Yuan (2012) in their analysis of the equity markets, we build a similar oil sentiment index and compare the performance of a fundamental model before and after this sentiment index has been included. Prompt month futures of WTI and Brent crude oils are used from January 2002 to December 2013 at monthly frequency. Baker and Wurgler (2006) used the following sentiment proxies in an equity context: volume of trades, market volatility, closed end fund discount, IPO number and opening returns, and the put call ratio. None of these was, on their own, a simple measure of sentiment; each had an idiosyncratic component but a principal component analysis (PCA) was applied to extract the common signal. In this investigation we use: the volume of the oil futures traded, the historic volatility of the oil price, the put-call ratio of oil options, the ratio of speculative trades to oil demand and the implied volatility of a local stock market index, namely the S&P 500 for WTI and the Euro Stoxx 50 for Brent. None of these is a pure measure of sentiment but, we use a PCA process to extract the common signal similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006) .
The selected proxies for WTI or Brent crude oil are entered into a principal component analysis, the rst principal component of which is dened as the sentiment index for each oil. It is established that low correlations exist between changes in the sentiment indices and changes in a range of key fundamental economic variables, showing that the eectiveness of these indices is not a consequence of fundamental information.
As these sentiment indices are extracted from proxies for sentiment similar to proxies used in equities research, it is reasonably argued that these indices are measuring oil market sentiment.
To test the inuence of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oil, each index is added to a benchmark oil price model consisting of non sentiment variables. The eect of sentiment on oil prices is then evaluated statistically while explicitly controlling for key fundamental variables that are known to drive oil prices. These key fundamental drivers are: broad economic performance as measured by stock index movements, we use the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, Hang Seng and Nikkei which represent the US, the Eurozone, China and Japan the world's four largest consumers of oil, following Li and Lin (2011);  1. the US dollar exchange rates for the stock indices used in (i), namely the Euro, Japanese Yen and Hong Kong dollar following Reboredo (2012) , Beckmann and Czudaj (2013) and Brahmasrene, Huang and Sissoko (2014) who indicate a direct connection between foreign exchange rates and oil prices; 2. the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), following Kilian (2009) Lin and Tamvakis (2010) and Coleman (2012) .
To informally measure the improvement to the fundamental model we calculate the adjusted R 2 and F-test results; the likelihood ratio test is used to formally test whether the improvement to the models after the inclusion of the sentiment indices is signicant or not. As we perform 92 simultaneous hypothesis tests, it is necessary to address the multiple comparison problem. That is, when many hypothesis tests are being carried out simultaneously there is a probability that some null hypotheses may be rejected falsely. This is addressed with a generalised version of the multiple hypothesis testing procedure of Holm (1979) .
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explains the selection of the proxies and the method by which principal component analyses were used to form the oil sentiment indices for WTI and Brent. Section 3 shows the methods used for building the fuel price benchmark models against which the two indices will be tested. Section 4 presents the empirical results for WTI and Brent crude oils and demonstrates the robustness of our nding that sentiment inuences oil prices using a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework. Section 5 concludes.
Creating an oil sentiment index
In this section the method of constructing an oil sentiment index is described. The construction involves combining proxies for sentiment using PCA, as used by Baker and Stein (2004) , Baker and Wurgler (2006) , Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) , and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) who examine sentiment in the equities market.
The proxies used for the oil markets are selected so as to be similar to those which have been used building sentiment indices in equity research.
Selecting the oil sentiment proxies
Equities research uses a wide variety of proxies for sentiment. None of these proxies are a perfect measure of sentiment but they are combined using principal component analysis (PCA) to produce useful sentiment indices. In the same way proxies for sentiment are chosen from the oil market data and are combined using PCA to form a sentiment index for each of WTI and for Brent crude oils. Baker and Wurgler (2006) use the following proxies NYSE turnover, closed end fund discount, number of and average rst day return of IPOs, share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues and dividend premium. These are combined in the PCA process to produce a sentiment index. Baker and Wurgler (2006) explain that while each proxy will contain an idiosyncratic as well as sentiment component, the PCA isolates the common sentiment component. We chose appropriate oil market proxies based on sentiment research in equities which measure market activity, oil price volatility, market fear, speculation and general stock market volatility. These choices are supported from within the literature as set out below and in Table 1 . The proxies selected to build the oil sentiment indices are specic to each crude oil as follows: Volume of trades are used as a proxy for investor sentiment by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , Baker and Stein (2004) , Baker and Wurgler (2007) and Canba³ and Kandr (2009) . While it is clear that the volume of trades is a direct measure of market activity, the literature shows that it is also an indicator of market sentiment.
Volatility is considered to be a measure of market fear by Whaley (2000) , hence the choice of a volatility measure as a sentiment proxy for each oil. The oil-based implied volatility measure (OVX) was not available for the 12 years required. Hence the 30-day historical volatility of the oil futures price is used. This is calculated as the standard deviation of the log price returns for the previous 30 trading days for prompt month futures contracts. Thirty-day volatility, which uses approximately the previous month-and-a-half of price data, was chosen as it is a reasonable compromise between the measurement of the volatility being accurate and being current. The volatility gures are obtained from Bloomberg LP and are the second proxy.
The put-call ratio has been used as a measure of market fear in equity research, for example by Bathia and Bredin (2013) . The put-call ratio for oil futures options is the third proxy. The data used is the aggregated open interest futures from Bloomberg LP.
Speculation was measured by Coleman (2012) and Bunn and Chen (2013) The VIX was used as a proxy of sentiment by Simon and Wiggins III (2001) . Volatility indices are considered to be measures of investor fear or anxiety (Whaley, 2000 (Whaley, , 2009 
Building a sentiment index by principal component analysis
This investigation uses PCA to produce a linear combination of the proxies. The rst principal component is the linear combination of the proxies which captures the maximum variance compared with other linear combinations subject to normalisation. Baker and Wurgler (2007) oer two comments regarding the robustness of this method:
rst that it reduces reliance on individual proxies (even though measured individually some are very signicant); and second, that an index constructed from individual proxies would behave almost identically to that formed by PCA.
A rst stage index is constructed (following Baker and Wurgler, 2006) to decide whether to use each proxy's current value or its rst time-lagged value. This is to take into consideration the possibility that some of the proxies may be stronger leading indicators than others. The rst stage index is the rst principal component of all the current and rst lags of the proxies. For each proxy the correlation of the current value with the rst stage index and the correlation of the proxy's rst lag with the rst stage index are calculated. The larger value decides whether the current or rst lag is chosen to build the sentiment indices. The selected proxies are then used in a second PCA stage, the rst principal component of which is dened to be the sentiment index for the crude oil in question.
The results of the PCA based oil sentiment construction processes are summarised in calculates the ratio of the components which maximises variance subject to the sum of the squared loadings being one.
Wang (2001) showed that sentiment from speculators and hedgers did contain useful information regarding the movements of agricultural commodity prices but that sentiment from small traders was not useful. It is conjectured here that sentiment in the professionally-traded oil markets is useful as the vast majority of the traders in the energy markets are highly informed professionals. When Baker and Wurgler (2006) , Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Chung, Hung and Yeh (2012) examined the stock markets they used an orthogonalisation procedure to remove from the equity sentiment proxies anything which could be attributed to the economic cycle. This procedure effectively produced an index which depended heavily on the choice of economic cycle variables. In order to capture the sentiment in the oil markets, this orthogonalisation step is not carried out. This choice keeps the sentiment indices and the fundamental variables independent of each other. This approach is argued to be reasonable due to there being insignicant or low correlation between the oil sentiment indices and the fundamental variables (Table 3 ). This nding also refutes a criticism that the sentiment indices are eective because they capture fundamental information.
2.3. The sentiment indices for WTI and Brent 
Testing framework
To test whether changes in the oil sentiment indices explain price movements in prompt-month futures contracts for WTI and Brent, a benchmark model for these crude oils is proposed and tested using a multivariate regression. The benchmark model is specically chosen to capture fundamental rather than sentiment inuences on oil prices. The oil sentiment indices are added to the benchmark model for each crude oil and the extended models are tested again. Changes in model performance are measured using the informal adjusted R 2 measure and variance ratio tests, along with formal likelihood ratio tests. A common model for both oils is used so that a fair comparison may be made of the eect of the sentiment index on WTI and Brent crude oils.
Benchmark model specication
Benchmark models for WTI and Brent are proposed at monthly frequency using the following fundamental variables: The table shows the correlations between the rst dierences of the fundamental variables, and the rst dierences of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent crude oils. These fundamental variables are used in the benchmark models of oil price. The results are generally very low correlation with 18 of the 26 correlations below the 5% signicance level of 0.1642. The sentiment index for WTI is weakly correlated with the stock indices which is expected as the US is a larger oil producer than Europe. We choose a selection of equity indices, from the US (world's largest oil consumer), the Eurozone (2nd), China (3rd) and Japan (4th) which together accounted for 50% of world Fan and Xu (2011) and Coleman (2012) . A criticism of using the BDI is that it is inuenced by fuel costs, and so is an endogenous variable.
This problem is addressed by Kilian (2009) who states that the variation in BDI rates is much larger than the variation in bunker fuel costs, and so the inuence of the endogeneity is not important. BDI t is the Baltic Dry index of shipping costs.
Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate is used because Coleman (2012) Following the basic law of supply and demand, the US oil inventory and world oil supply from the US Dept of Energy (DOE) are also included. U S Oil Inventory t is the US oil inventory, W orld Oil Supply t is the world oil supply.
The proportion of world oil that is produced by OPEC has been found to inuence oil prices by Kaufmann (2004) , Lin and Tamvakis (2010) and Coleman (2012) . This would occur due to market power. Also included is the dierence between OPEC's estimated capacity and the production as this represents the decision of OPEC producers to restrict supply. OP EC SpareCapacity t and OP EC P rop t are the OPEC spare capacity and OPEC proportion of world production.
Based on the above arguments, the benchmark model for WTI and Brent crude oil are set out in Eq. 3.1. Before running the regressions, all the data are log transformed, rst-dierenced, standardised and checked for stationarity using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests which show the log returns of the fundamental variables and sentiment indices to be stationary. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 4 . The benchmark model is given in Eq. 3.1:
Oil t = α + β 1 S&P 500 t + β 2 Stoxx 50 t + β 3 N KY t + β 4 Hang Seng t , +β 5 U SDEU R t + β 6 U SDJP Y t + β 7 U SDHKD t + +β 8 BDI t +β 9 Corp Bond t + β 10 U S Oil Inventory t + β 11 W orld Oil Supply t +β 12 OP EC Spare Capacity t + β 13 OP EC P rop t + ε t
where all variables are expressed in log returns and Oil t is the WTI or Brent prompt month crude oil price.
With the addition of the sentiment index this model becomes: where Oil Sentiment t is the value of the oil sentiment index for WTI or Brent at time t measured in months. As is usual practice, standardised variables are used so that comparisons between the variables may be made and so that calculations may not be liable to oating point errors (Aboura and Chevallier, 2013) , thus the α terms are zero.
Results
There is a clear improvement to the benchmark models for WTI and Brent on the inclusion of the oil sentiment indices as is seen in Table 5 . This indicates that these indices, and hence oil market sentiment, has a signicant inuence on WTI and Brent oil prices.
Performance of oil sentiment index
The sentiment indices for WTI and Brent make a statistically signicant and economically important improvement to the fundamental models for oil price changes during the 12 years from January 2002 to December 2013. The results are presented in Table 5 and show that the adjusted R 2 increases in the WTI and Brent benchmark models from 35% and 30% to 52% and 49% respectively; in addition the variance ratio test is much more signicant. More formally, there is a strongly signicant result from the likelihood ratio test of the improvement to the fundamental model, after the inclusion of the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent.
Looking at the results in Table 5 it is notable that the coecients of the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50 and the Nikkei are all insignicant except for Stoxx for WTI when sentiment is included; this anomaly will be revisited below in section 4.2. This is unconvincing evidence that these stock markets have an inuence on oil prices. This result is in line with the nding of Fan and Xu (2011) that the S&P500 was not signicant for roughly the same period of time. Following the results of Alquist and Gervais (2013) and Beirne et al. (2013) , we nd that there is evidence at conventional levels that the Hang Seng signicantly explains WTI and Brent prices, but this will be revisited in section 4.2.
The exchange rates used are expressed as the price of US$1 in various local currencies, namely the Euro, Yen and Hong Kong dollar. Only the Euro and the Japanese
Yen are found to be signicant, though the Yen is much less signicant than the Euro.
The cost of one US dollar in Japanese Yen has a positive coecient meaning that a weakening Yen is on average accompanied by higher oil prices measured in US dollars.
The links between exchange rates and oil prices are not entirely straightforward, (see Beckmann and Czudaj 2013, and Reboredo 2012) , but it is clear that an appreciation in oil price is accompanied by appreciation of the currency of the exporter, and since Japan produces a much smaller amount of oil than the US (140,000 barrels per day from Japan in contrast to 11,110,000 from the US) 2 , the positive coecient is in line with expectations. The coecient of the cost of US$1 in Euro is negative, indicating that a weakening Euro against the US dollar is, on average, accompanied by negative oil price returns and so a fall in the price of oil measured in US dollars. This indicates that as the Euro weakens Europeans will actually have to buy fewer of the more expensive dollars to pay for oil. This may be because a depreciation of the local currency causes lower demand for oil, as explained in the 'denomination channel' by Beckmann and Czudaj (2013) . The greater size of Eurozone relative to Japan and the fact that the Eurozone (which does not include UK or Norway) produces 500,000 barrels of oil per day, may explain why the Euro exchange rate coecient is negative while the Yen's coecient is positive.
It is interesting that there is very weak evidence that the Baltic Dry Index (BDI)
2 The 2012 data is from the US Energy Information Administration and was accessed on 29th October 2014 from http://www.eia.gov/countries/ is associated with oil price changes; it is only just signicant at the 10% level. This is unexpected as the BDI has been used as a proxy for worldwide industrial activity by Mitchell et al. (2005) , Frale et al. (2008) , Kilian (2009 ), Fan and Xu (2011 ), and Coleman (2012 . The cost of borrowing as measured by Moody's Aaa corporate bond rate has the expected positive coecient as found by Coleman (2012) indicating that as borrowing becomes more expensive so does oil. As would be expected by the law of supply and demand, the US oil inventory has a highly signicant negative coecient for WTI prices and a less signicant negative coecient for Brent prices. There is no evidence that world oil supply is signicant; which is unexpected. OPEC spare capacity is a measure of the dierence between OPEC capacity to deliver oil and the actual quantity delivered, it is thus a measure of how much oil OPEC is holding back from the market. This variable has a positive coecient as expected. Finally the proportion of world oil production which is from OPEC has a signicant positive coecient indicating that OPEC has considerable market power as is expected from the work of Kaufmann (2004) and Lin and Tamvakis (2010 Cummins (2013a) and Cummins (2013b) .
To give the greatest power to identify true discoveries, we set a probability of α = 0.1 as the upper bound probability that there are k = 5 or more false rejections of null hypotheses amongst the 92 tests; we choose 5 as this is approximately 5% of the total number of hypotheses tested. Using these criteria we can be much more assured that the conclusions we draw are statistically reliable and robust. In this particular study, the generalised Holm procedure (Romano, Shaikh and Wolf, 2010) leads us to reject 48 null hypotheses while at the conventional signicance of 5%, 63 hypotheses would have been rejected. This MHT framework is more conservative than conventional signicance levels, where in the latter case one ignores the multiple comparisons problem.
In so doing wrong economic conclusions could be drawn from the extra 15 rejected null hypotheses. With this motivation in place, we revisit the results set out in the previous section (4.1) and seek to address the multiple comparisons problem that was not explicitly considered. This is an important statistical correction missing from prior sentiment investigations.
In Table 5 results which are considered signicant under the MHT process are indicated in bold. Most notably, there is no change to the conclusion that the sentiment indices for WTI and Brent oil signicantly account for oil prices. This is an important nding and allows us to argue with statistical condence that sentiment aects professionally traded oil markets. It is also found that the US$ Euro exchange rate signicantly explains the movement of oil prices. At the more demanding levels of signicance required by the MHT procedure, the anomalous result found perviously that changes in the Stoxx 50 explained WTI price movements is not found to be signicant.
Furthermore the Hang Seng and the BDI are not found to be signicant. The US$ Yen exchange rate, the Moody corporate bond rate, the US oil inventory, OPEC spare capacity and OPEC proportion are found to be signicant.
Conclusion
We nd that sentiment is an important consideration when explaining WTI and Brent prices using data from Jan 2002 to Dec 2013. This was done following the methods of Baker and Wurgler (2006) by building sentiment indices for both WTI and Brent using similar proxies to those used in equities research. The two indices were constructed using principal component analysis of the following sentiment proxies: volume of futures contracts, the volatility of the oil price, oil speculation indicators, the put-call ratio for options on oil futures and stock index volatility. The inclusion of these sentiment indices signicantly improved the performance of fundamental models for oil prices as measured by the likelihood ratio test and also brought about a large increase in the adjusted R 2 statistic. The ndings are supported by a multiple hypothesis testing framework which gives a very high degree of condence that we are not merely observing a chance result due to the multiple comparison problem.
Sentiment has already been seen to aect equity markets, our ndings expand sentiment to energy markets. This not only leaves open the possibility that sentiment indices can be constructed for energy markets other than oil (gas and coal being the natural next steps), but also acts as a call for further research on the mechanism by which sentiment inuences oil pricing, and also a decomposition of this sentiment inuence into its rational and irrational components. This latter investigation would be of particular benet to policy makers seeking to control irrational exuberance and excessive speculation with its associated impact on the economy
